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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

it

Case No. 880181
Category No. 2

1

MICHAEL C. THOMPSON and
BRUCE A. CONKLIN,

1

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, having granted the Defendants' Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, on the sole issue of the propriety of
admission of evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena Powers
Act.
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The Court of Appeals decision of which the Defendants
obtained review by this Court is State v. Thompson, et al., 751
P.2d 805 (Utah App. 1988), where the defendants' convictions in
Third District Court for bribery, anti-trust, and racketeering
were upheld.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Do the defendants have standing to invoke the

exclusionary rule with respect to evidence used to convict them
at trial?

2.

Was the Trial Court correct in admitting evidence

obtained by use of the Subpoena Powers Act?
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The controlling constitutional and statutory provisions
are reproduced in full in the addendum to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case.

Defendant Michael C.

Thompson, was convicted after a jury trial in the Third District
Court of five counts of bribery in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-508(b), each a Class B misdemeanor, one count of antitrust
violation under Utah Code Ann. SS 76-10-914 and 76-10-920, and
two counts of racketeering in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1603, with each of the racketeering counts being a felony of
the second degree.

Defendant Bruce A. Conklin, was convicted

following the same jury trial of five counts of bribery in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-508(b), each a Class B
misdemeanor, one count of antitrust violation under Utah Code
Ann. SS 76-10-914 and 76-10-920, and one count of racketeering in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1603, the racketeering count
being a felony of the second degree.
The convictions on all counts of both defendants were
upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Thompson, et al.,
751 P.2d 805 (Utah App. 1988).
This Court granted the Petition for Certiorari by the
defendants on the sole issue of the propriety of admission of
evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act.

_o_

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court, Judge Judith M. Billings, presiding, on July 19,
through August 1, 1985.

Following trial, the jury found each

defendant guilty of five counts of bribery and of all antitrust
and racketeering counts (R. 378).
On September 13, 1985, the trial court sentenced
defendant Thompson to serve not less than one year nor more than
15 years in the Utah State Prison (R. 455-457).

Defendant

Conklin was sentenced to serve one year in the Salt Lake County
Jail on work release (R. 448-450).

Defendants were each fined

$25,000.00 for the antitrust violations (R. 449, 456).
The defendants filed a Notice of Appeal on September
13, 1985.

Their sentences were stayed on appeal, and their

initial brief as well as the State's response was filed in this
Court.

Subsequently, the case was transferred by this Court to

the Utah Court of Appeals.

The case was then certified to this

Court by the Court of Appeals, but was returned to the Court of
Appeals where the case was briefed and argued.
807)

(751 P.2d 805,

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendants convictions in

an opinion published March 9, 1988, and denied petitioner's
Petition for Rehearing on April 8, 1988.
As previously indicated, this Court granted a petition
for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals on the issue
of whether evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act
was properly admitted by the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Utah law provides two methods for formally
investigating criminal activities.

The first is the grand jury

process; the second is that authorized by the Subpoena Powers
Act, Utah Code Ann. S 77-22-1 to 3 (1982).

(See Addendum A)

It

is the Subpoena Powers Act and evidence gathered pursuant to the
Act which is the focus of the issues before the Court in this
case.
This Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the
Act and discussed at length its provisions, philosophical
underpinnings, and purposes, in In the Matter of a Criminal
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988).1
As this Court observed the Act was passed in 1971 and
recodified in 1980.

The legislature specifically set forth the

purposes of the Act.
"It is declared, as a matter of
legislative determination, that it is
necessary to grant subpoena powers in aid of
criminal investigations and to provide a
method of keeping information gained from
investigations secret both to protect the
innocent and to prevent criminal suspects
from having access to information prior to
prosecution and to clarify the power of the
attorney general and county attorneys to
grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses
whose testimony is essential to the proper
conduct of a criminal investigation or
prosecution." § 77-22-1, Utah Code Ann.
(1982).
Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the Utah
Attorney General obtained the approval of the Seventh District
The Utah Legislature amended the Subpoena Powers Act in the
1989 General Session to confront with the Court's opinion. The
amended portions of the statute are included in Addendum B.
-4-

Court, to conduct an investigation.
This authorization of the District Court was obtained
on January 26, 1983. As this Court has observed regarding the
investigation,
M

The scope of the investigation was set
forth in a good cause affidavit, signed by a
special agent of the attorney general, that
accompanied the application. The affidavit
stated that on the basis of a confidential
report prepared by the Utah Department of
Business Regulation's Division of Public
Utilities, interviews with unnamed sources,
and an investigation of UP & L, the affiant
had concluded that certain of UP & L's assets
had been stolen. The affidavit described the
stolen assets as UP & L's labor and
materials. The affidavit further alleged
that the theft of these assets had been
accomplished by kickbacks, payoffs, bidfixing, falsification of shipment and
delivery information, personal use or sale of
UP & L property, and threats.
Id. at 638.
Pursuant to the Act the District Court authorized the
Attorney General to conduct the criminal investigation and
further authorized the issuance of subpoenas compelling the
attendance and sworn testimony of witnesses and the production of
books, papers, documents, etc. which constitute evidence "which
is or may be relevant to the investigation in the judgement of
the Attorney General . . . • " S 77-22-2 Utah Code Ann. (1982).
See also .Id. at 754 P.2d 638.
Following this authorization the Attorney General did
subpoena witnesses and gather documents.

The defendants

themselves were never subpoenaed, nor did they ever testify in
connection with the investigation.

As this Court has observed, subpoenas were directed to
banks, state agencies, and other document repositories.

J^i. at

638.
The subpoenas directed to the bank accounts of the
defendants and/or over which they had signature authority were
complied with and information relative to the banking
transactions of the defendants as well as L. Brent Fletcher,
Security Director for Utah Power and Light Company were obtained.
The defendants were not notified of the existence of these
subpoenas by the Attorney General nor presumably were the
defendants notified by the banking institutions of these
subpoenas.
These subpoenas and others as well as interviews and
other investigative efforts produced evidence upon which charges
were brought against the defendants, Michael Ziemski, and L.
2
Brent Fletcher.
The charges were filed against the defendants in April
of 1984 in 5th (now 3rd) Circuit Court in Salt Lake County.

The

following month motions to quash certain subpoenas were filed in
7th District Court by certain recipients of subpoenas and it was
argued at that time, (May 1984) that among other things the Act
was unconstitutional.

The Seventh District Court ruled that the

Subpoena Powers Act would be presumed constitutional provided
certain procedures were followed by the Attorney General's
2
The conviction of Ziemski was affirmed along with that of the
defendants in State v. Thompson, et al. 751 P.2d 805 (Utah App.
1988), but he is not a party to this action. Fletcher's
conviction was affirmed in State v. Fletcher, 751 P.2d 822 (Utah
App. 1988).

office.

Id. at 639.
The Seventh District Court subsequently ruled on

September 20, 1984, that the Act was unconstitutional on its face
and as applied.

Ici. at 639.

(See Addendum C).

It is important

to note that the Seventh District Court gave no opinion and
rendered no judgement whatever about whether the rights of the
defendants had been violated and certainly did not attempt to
rule on the admissibility of evidence, nor upon the validity of
any of the subpoenas which produced evidence against the
defendants.
Subsequently, the defendants brought a motion to
suppress certain evidence in December 1984 in Third District
Court.

During the hearing on the Motion to Suppress (R.1037.

Transcript Dated Dec. 27, 1984) the defendants did not identify
what they claimed were defective subpoenas even though they had
been supplied with those subpoenas which had produced evidence in
the case (R.1037, p.5), nor did they specify what evidence was
gathered in violation of their rights. The Motion was denied and
the defendants proceeded to trial resulting in their convictions
and in the affirmance of those convictions on appeal.
The defendants' petition for writ of certiorari was
granted on the single issue of whether evidence gathered pursuant
to the Subpoena Powers Act should have been suppressed.
Defendants have incorrectly and no doubt inadvertently
stated that "the trial court admitted evidence based on an
unconstitutional statute- (Defendants' Brief, pp. 33*34).

This

statement is wrong and without foundation inasmuch as this Court

specifically held the Subpoena Powers Act to be constitutional.
In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The defendants characterize the investigation which led
to their convictions as having been conducted in violation of
their Utah and Federal constitutional rights. However,
defendants have never demonstrated why they have standing to make
this argument.

Specifically defendants have failed to explain

why subpoenas sent to third parties impinge upon their
constitutional rights.

This Court has ruled in situations

comparable to the case before the bar that constitutional rights
are personal in nature and cannot be claimed through third
parties.

Similarly, the State urges this Court in this matter to

rule that bank and other records in the possesssion of depository
institutions may be obtained through legal process and are not
suppressable for the reason that the obtaining of these records
(through proper legal process) does not create any standing in
the defendants.
A closely related though separate issue is whether or
not the evidence obtained by the Subpoena Powers Act should have
been suppressed.

Both the Trial Court and the Utah Court of

Appeals have ruled that the documents should not be suppressed
and were properly admissible.
The defendants have repeatedly made the general
nonspecific argument that their constitutional rights were
violated.

The defendants have never explained how, in what

particulars, these rights were violated nor do they identify

which piece or pieces of evidence were admitted in violation of
those rights nor do they explain how evidence in the possession
of third parties was subpoenaed in violation of their rights.
The Court is urged to affirm the holding of the Trial
Court and Court of Appeals that evidence gathered pursuant to the
Subpoena Powers Act was properly admitted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO INVOKE
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WITH RESPECT TO
EVIDENCE USED TO CONVICT THEM AT TRIAL
The defendants' rights were not violated during the
criminal investigation that resulted in their convictions.

They

make sweeping allegations that their rights, Fourth and Fifth
Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protection, under both the
Federal and Utah State Constitutions, suffered wholesale
violation during the criminal investigation that ultimately
resulted in their convictions.

They further claim that these

alleged violations require a wholesale suppression of the
evidence used to convict them.

However, defendants fail to

support these allegations with any facts or applicable law.
Respondent State of Utah submits that in fact none of
defendants' individual constitutional rights were violated during
the investigation, and evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena
Powers Act was properly admitted.
A.

Search and Seizure.
Defendants argue that their Fourth Amendment rights

were violated when the Attorney General subpoenaed records from

"appellants' bankers, accountants and business associates," but
defendants completely fail to identify or be specific about what
those records are and from whom they were obtained.

The record

in this case at (R. 391-404) sets forth what exhibits were
admitted, yet the defendants fail to identify what documents were
received in violation of their rights. This lack of specificity
permeates the whole of the defendants' arguments to this Court
(Defendants' Brief p.9).

In fact the defendants' bank and

business records were subpoenaed and used as evidence against
them at their trial, but defendants themselves were never
subpoenaed nor did they give any testimony.

It is not enough for

defendants to claim prejudice merely through the use of evidence
gathered from a third party, even assuming a violation of the
rights of the subpoenaed person.

This has been stated clearly by

the U.S. Supreme Court, "[t]he established principle is that
suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendmient violation can be
successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by
the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the
introduction of damaging evidence."
394 U.S. 165, 171 (1968).

Alderman v. United States,

The evidence about which the

defendants complain was the product of subpoenas sent to third
parties.
Defendants reliance on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886) which held invalid a statute requiring a criminal
defendant to divulge personal "books, papers, and records," is
misplaced.

Appellants seek to extend the holding of Boyd to the

"books, papers, and records" in the possession of and held by

"appellants' bankers, accountants and business associates."

This

ignores an entire line of cases from both this Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court which require that a defendant be directly
aggrieved in order to have standing to challenge the legality of
the search and seek to suppress the evidence.

The United States

Supreme Court has stated,
M

In order to qualify as a 'person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure'
one must be the victim of a search or
seizure, one against whom the search was
directed, as distinguished from one who
claims prejudice only through the use of
evidence gathered as a consequence of a
search or seizure directed at someone else. .
. .

"Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper
to require of one who seeks to challenge the
legality of a search as the basis for
suppressing relevant evidence that he allege,
and if the allegations be disputed that he
establish, that he himself was the victim of
the invasion of privacy.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 (1968), citing,
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, at 261 (1960).

Without

defendants showing the necessary factual nexus between the
violation of their individual rights and the gathering of the
complained of evidence, suppression is simply not an appropriate
remedy.

The Supreme Court was later petitioned to expand the

concept of standing defined in Jones to a so-called "targettheory," which is essentially appellants' position in this case.
Under the target theory, a defendant would be able "to assert
that a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party
entitled him to have evidence suppressed at his trial."
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978).
held,

Rakas v.

However, the Supreme Court

We decline to extend the rule of
standing in Fourth Amendment cases in the
manner suggested by petitioners. As we
stated in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 174 (1969), "Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights which, like some other
constitutional rights, may not be vicariously
asserted." A person who is aggrieved by an
illegal search and seizure only through the
introduction of damaging evidence secured by
a search of a third person's premises or
property has not had any of his Fourth
Amendment rights infringed. And since the
exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate
the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, it is
proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated to
benefit from the rule's protections.
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 133-34 (citations omitted).

This

Court has similarly limited a defendant's right to seek
suppression of evidence to situations where there has been a
personal Fourth Amendment violation.
"The right of the people to be secure in
their persons and houses against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as assured by Sec. 14,
Art. I, Utah Constitution, and Amendment IV
of the federal Constitution is personal in
nature and can be asserted only by one whose
right is violated. [Defendant] had no such
rights in the house, car, or in the evidence
seized, and therefore cannot complain of the
court's refusal to suppress that evidence."
State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 480.

See also, State v.

Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (1966),and State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1335
(Utah 1984).

As in Griffin, Montayne and Valdez, defendants have

wholly failed to articulate a single fact or circumstance that
puts them in the position of having their individual Fourth
Amendment rights violated, and, therefore, cannot claim the
protection of the exclusionary rule to suppress the complained of
evidence.

Although the exclusionary rule is applied differently
to evidence obtained by warrant and evidence obtained by
subpoena, a violation of a Fourth Amendment right has still been
held to be a necessary prerequisite for the suppression of
evidence gathered by subpoena.

United States v. Millerf 425 U.S.

435 (1976).
Defendants also ignore a plethora of policy reasons set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court identifying the exclusionary rule
as a judicially mandated safeguard of Fourth Amendment rights.
It is not a constitutional right.
The primary justification for the
exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of
police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment
rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established
that the rule is not a personal
constitutional right. It is not calculated
to redress the injury to the privacy of the
victim of the search or seizure, for any
M
[reparation comes too late." Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
'the rule is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect...."
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).

The Court went on in

Powell to state:
The standing requirement is premised on
the view that the 'additional benefits of
extending the . . . rule' to defendants other
than the victim of the search or seizure are
outweighed by the 'further encroachment upon
the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or
convicted on the basis of all the evidence
which exposes the truth.' Alderman v. United
States, supra, at 174-175 (emphasis added).
Id. at 489-90.
268, 275-76.

See also. United States v. Ceccolini# 435 U.S.

Nothing in In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation,
supra or in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) changes
the initial burden which defendants must meet to establish a
violation of their rights and their entitlement to suppression of
allegedly illegally seized evidence.

At no stage during this

case, either at the trial level, before the Utah Court of
Appeals, or before this Court, have defendants challenged or even
identified any subpoena issued personally to them, nor
established any standing to raise issues vicariously involving
subpoenas issued to third parties.
Under the United States Supreme Court's exclusionary
rule, the good faith exception would apply to the facts of this
case, in the event that petitioners had shown a violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights justifying the initial application
of the exclusionary rule.

The "good faith" exception or

"objectively reasonable" standard discussed by this Court in
Mendoza, supra and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
does not apply, since the defendants have failed to show that any
evidence was illegally taken.
B.

Self Incrimination!
The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution

provides protection against self-incrimination.

Article I,

Section 12 of the Utah Constitution protects a person from being
compelled to give evidence against himself.
The Fifth Amendment protection against self
incrimination like the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that has
not been permitted to be asserted on behalf of third parties.

"It is important to reiterate that the
Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal
privilege: it adheres basically to the
person, not to information that may
incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put
it: 'A party is privileged from producing
the evidence but not from its production.'
Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458
(1913). The Constitution explicitly
prohibits compelling an accused to bear
witness 'against himself; it necessarily
does not proscribe incriminating statements
elicited from another.
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1972)
(emphasis in original).
Defendants seek to create a Fifth Amendment right, and
a corresponding Utah right derived from Article I, Section 12 of
the Utah Constitution, against self incrimination when
defendants' bankers, accountants, and business associates are
subpoenaed to testify and produce documents as part of the
special investigation.

The broad protections outlined in In re

Criminal Investigation, supra and cited in defendants' brief,
(see Defendants' Brief pp. 11-12) are protections they attempt to
assert for themselves as third parties for and in behalf of
witnesses who in fact are not the defendants.
The U.S. Supreme court has dealt with a case where
records were subpoenaed from an accused's accountant in Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1972).

The Court held,

In the case before us the ingredient
of personal compulsion against an accused is
lacking. The summons and the order of the
District Court enforcing it are directed
against the accountant. He, not the
taxpayer, is the only one compelled to do
anything. And the accountant makes no claim
that he may tend to be incriminated by the
production. Inquisitorial pressure or
coercion against a potentially accused

person, compelling her, against her will, to
utter self-condemning words or produce
incriminating documents is absent. In the
present case, no 'shadow of testimonial
compulsion upon or enforced communication by
the accused' is involved.
Id. at 329, (citations and footnote omitted).
Defendants attempt to support their position citing the
fact that Brent Fletcher was not informed of his target status
when his deposition was taken (Defendants' Brief p.12).

However,

Mr. Fletcher's trial was severed from that of defendants, he is
not an appellant in this case, and his deposition was suppressed
and not used against him in his trial, nor obviously against the
defendants.

Defendants' reference to the Fletcher deposition is

an example of their attempt to find some personal rights
violation vicariously, and further demonstrates defendants' lack
of any violation of their own right against self-incrimination.
In fact, defendants were never subpoenaed to testify
during the investigation.

They have claimed that they were put

into a position of having to incriminate themselves. Therefore,
the defendants, at the time of the subpoena, and "at the time the
records were admitted at trial, [were] not subjected to 'the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.'"
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 (1976).

The protections

against self incrimination sought by defendants have not been
recognized as part of Fifth Amendment protection nor of Article
I, Section 12, Utah State Constitutional protection against self
incrimination and should not now become one.

To allow a

defendant to claim the privilege against self incrimination when
other witnesses are subpoenaed to testify or produce physical

evidence about that defendant would unnecessarily muzzle law
enforcement efforts at detecting, investigating, and prosecuting
criminal conduct.
C.

Due Processt
Defendants assert a Due Process violation in that,

••Judge Bunnell terminated the investigation because of violations
of constitutional rights of the subjects of this investigation."
(Defendants' Brief p. 13). Defendants again fail to cite any
facts as to what, where, when, or how their personal rights were
violated.

They point out the fact that Judge Bunnell could not

rule on the admissibility of the evidence they seek to exclude.
Obviously, Judge Bunnell could not rule on the admissibility of
the evidence, inasmuch as trial was held in Salt Lake County
before the Third District Court, but there is nothing about that
fact that worked any prejudicial error against the defendants.
Defendants seek to strengthen their claim of a Due
Process violation by reasserting Fourth Amendment interests
(Defendants' Brief p. 14) and by noting that this Court said the
investigation was inadequately documented, thus forcing
defendants "to argue [their] case before a judge who was
unfamiliar with the details of the investigation • . . improperly
saddle[ing defendants] with the burden of proving both a
'substantial violation' of fundamental rights and 'lack of good
faith' on the part of the investigating officer."

(Defendants'

Brief p. 14). Inasmuch as they were never subpoenaed, the
defendants did not suffer the Due Process violation they allege;
they were not improperly saddled with the burden of proving a

lack of good faith or a substantial violation of fundamental
rights.
D.

Equal Protectioni
The defendants suggest (p. 17 of Defendant's Brief)

that this Court ruled In The Matter of a Criminal Investigation,
supra, that notice must be given to targets of the investigation.
This generalization misstates the holding of that case.

This

Court required that notice be given to subpoenaed targets, but
did not hold, indeed specifically reserved the question in
footnote 23, of whether notice must be given to the target of an
investigation if the target has not been subpoenaed.

No equal

protection, uniform operation of laws rights arise when a target
is being investigated but not subpoenaed.
Defendants assert that, "the manner in which the
investigation was carried out in the instant case violated
defendants' rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution."

(Defendants' Brief p. 11).

Such an assertion could have validity only if this
Court finds that a criminal defendant convicted upon evidence
gathered from third parties has the right to notice and the right
to challenge subpoenas issued to third parties to investigate
that defendant before the filing of an information.
The defendants seek to extend the warning and notice
requirements from subpoenaed parties to anyone who is a target of
the investigation.

As indicated, this Court did not hold that

such notice was required in In the Matter of a Criminal
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988).

Defendants refer to the requirement of disclosure of
the good cause affidavit.

Defendants express concern that

without access to the good cause affidavit, individuals receiving
subpoenas would not be able to determine whether the information
sought came within the scope of the Affidavit.

(See Defendants'

Brief p. 10). Defendants further assert that the secrecy
provisions of the Act were applied to broadly.

While these are

legitimate concerns as they relate to subpoenaed persons, they
raise no legitimate issue as to the rights of persons not
subpoenaed.

For the defendants to gain the position they seek,

this Court would have to extent the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures under Art I, Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution to subpoenas issued to third parties so that the
target of an investigation would have to be given full and
adequate notice that the target's banker, accountant, business
associates, friends, relatives, etc., etc., etc. have been
subpoenaed.
The issue of whether a defendant can assert a violation
of his Fourth Amendment of State constitutional rights through
the investigation of a third party, e.g., bankers and CPAs, was
expressly reserved by this Court in In the Matter of a Criminal
Investigation, supra, at 654, fn 23 which states,
" a broad subpoena issued to a third party
may invoke a target's privacy interests.
Although under federal law it has been held
that a target cannot challenge the
investigation of a third party, we have never
addressed the question as a matter of state
law." (citations omitted).

Defendants seek to overturn their convictions by having
this Court extend warning and notice requirements to anyone who
is a target of the investigation whether or not they were
subpoenaed.

As noted above such a policy may frustrate the

investigative process and would not serve any legitimate
constitutional concern.
POINT II
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM BANK RECORDS WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
Defendants have attempted in previous submissions to
this Court to establish a violation of their Fourth Amendment
privacy interests in the subpoenas directed at third parties by
citing, Burrows v. Superior Courtf 529 P.2d 590 (Calif. 1974).
In Burrows, bank records were suppressed because they
were obtained without a warrant, subpoena, or any court process
whatsoever.

It is this unique fact which the California court

focuses on in holding that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his bank records.

The court

acknowledges that federal cases hold that bank depositors have
neither proprietary interests in bank records, nor standing under
the Fourth Amendment to resist court process directed at the bank
records, and points out the factual distinction which they feel
merits their finding a violated privacy interest under the state
constitution in Burrows:
[I]t is worthy of note that the
foregoing and other federal cases involved
more than an informal request for
information: the material was furnished in
response to a summons or subpoena issued
either by an administrative body in
connection with an investigation, which

process is enforced by judicial order • • •
or by a court in the context of a criminal
proceeding.
Burrows, 529 P.2d 590, 594 (1974).
The majority opinion in Schultz contains
a statement to the effect that a summons
directed to a third-party bank is not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of
either the bank or the person under
investigation by the authorities. (416 U.S.
at p. 53, 94 S.Ct. 1494.) Of course here we
have no summons or other court process.
Burrowsy 529 P.2d 590, 595 (1974), n. 3.
The Burrows court claims consistency with United States
v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974).

In Miller, the Fifth

Circuit accepted a bank customer's claim to have a privacy
interest in microfilmed bank records, which were obtained by
government agents through allegedly defective subpoenas duces
tecum.

In reversing that portion of the Miller decision, the

United States Supreme Court stated:
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of
the depositor are implicated here, this case
is governed by the general rule that the
issuance of a subpoena to a third party to
obtain the records of that party does not
violate the rights of a defendant. . . .
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976).
In Miller, the Supreme Court effectively limits Burrows
to its facts:
This case differs from Burrows v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 238, 118 Cal. Rptr.
166, 529 P.2d 590 (1974), relied on by Mr.
Justice Brennan in dissent, in that the bank
records of respondent's accounts were
furnished in response to "compulsion by legal
process" in the form of subpoena duces tecum.
The court in Burrows found it "significant .
• . that the bank [in that case] provided the
statements to the police in response to an
informal oral request for information. • . •H

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435f 445 (1976), fn 7.
While this Court has the power to exceed the protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by interpreting Article I Section 14, the parallel
provision in the Utah Constitution, differently it should not
adopt the Burrows construction of a privacy interest in bank
records held by bank customers.

Burrows has been rejected in

Fitzgerald v. State, 599 P.2d 572, 577 (Wyo. 1979) and its
reasoning was not adopted in Peters v. Sjoholm, 604 P.2d 527
(Wash. App. 1979).

The United States Supreme Court's resolution

of Miller represents the position taken in most cases.

See State

v. Melvin, 357 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. App. 1987); State v. Fredette,
411 A.2d 65 (Me. 1979) United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733
(5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Reddick, 519 F.2d 645 (8th Cir.
1975); and United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1979).
In the present case, evidence was obtained through
valid legal process.

In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation,

754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988),

this Court in that case did not hold

that any subpoena issued or evidence introduced against the
defendants was done so in violation of their constitutional
rights.

In State v. Flynn, 464 A.2d 268 (N.H. 1983), Burrows was

adopted because it harmonized with a New Hampshire statute, and
in People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85 (111. App. 1983), Burrows was
adopted because it harmonized with a privacy provision separate
from the search and seizure provision in the state constitution.
In Jackson, after recognizing the Burrows quasiprivilege/ the court noted that the gathering of evidence through
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subpoena duces tecum is a constructive search, presenting no
actual search and seizure questions.

The Jackson court evaluated

the constructive search in that case, found that it was
reasonable, and did not suppress the evidence which consisted of
bank records.
Most of the state court decisions expanding the
protection of state search and seizure provisions beyond the
scope of the Fourth Amendment occur in cases where there is an
immediate and intimate violation of a privacy interest.
Lafave; Search and Seizure, section 1.3 p. 44.

See

In this case, the

asserted violation of privacy came through subpoenas duces tecum
as to which defendants had no standing to object.

Thus,

defendants cannot claim immediacy of the violation, nor can they
effectively assert that the violation was intimate:

the

subpoenas were not directed to them.
Defendants have presented no compelling argument for
this Court's recognition of the Burrows quasi-privilege under the
Utah Constitution.

Even if there were such a compelling argument

and recognition, it would have no bearing on this case.
Defendants here are challenging subpoenas, "legal process,"
issued under the authority of Judge Boyd Bunnell in Emery County,
which render Burrows inapposite.
In United States v. Miller, 425. U.S. 435 (1976), the
Supreme Court examined the issues of a depositor's Fourth
Amendment interests in bank records.

Respondent was charged with

various federal offenses and sought to suppress bank records. He
contended that the subpoena duces tecum pursuant to which the

material had been produced by the banks were defective and
therefore the records were illegally seized in violation of his
Fourth Amendment Rights. The Court noted that checks are
"negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions/'
not -confidential communications."

IcL at 442. The Court

further noted that all the documents that had been obtained from
the bank, including financial statements and deposit slips,
"contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business."
Id. at 442. The Court held,
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here
are not respondent's "private papers."
Unlike the Claimant in Boyd, respondent can
assert neither ownership nor possession.
Instead, these are the business records of
the banks.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1975).

The Court

went on to hold,
[s]ince no Fourth Amendment interests of the
depositor are implicated here, this case is
governed by the general rule that the
issuance of a subpoena to a third party to
obtain the records of that party does not
violate the rights of a defendant, even if
criminal prosecution is contemplated at the
time the subpoena is issued.
United State v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (quoting
California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 53. The
foundation for the Court's holding was based on the principle
that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when information
revealed to third parties is thereafter conveyed by the third
party to the government.

It is established that, when a person
communicates information to a third party
even on the understanding that the
communication is confidential, he cannot
object if the third party conveys that
information or records thereof to law
enforcement authorities (citations omitted).
Relying on that principle, the Court has held
that a customer of a bank cannot challenge on
Fourth Amendment grounds the admission into
evidence in a criminal prosecution of
financial records obtained by the Government
from his bank pursuant to allegedly defective
subpoenas, despite the fact that he was given
no notice of the subpoenas.
SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984)
(footnotes omitted).
In State v. Melvin, 357 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. App. 1987)
defendant (appellant) attempted to assert a Fourth Amendment
interest in bank records of third persons for whom he acted as an
estate administrator, and in bank records in his own personal
rental accounts.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals following

United States v. Miller, supra, and State v. Overton, 60 N.C.
App. 1, 298 S.E.2d 695, disc, rev, denied and appeal dism'd, 307
N.C. 580, 299 S.E.2d 652 (1983) held that defendant has no Fourth
Amendment interest in bank records his own or those of others
regardless of the manner in which they are obtained.

The Court

stated:
Defendant's contentions that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when the state
obtained an Application for Examination of
Records instead of a subpoena duces tecum and
when it received some records without even
this document are meritless. He had no
standing to contest the disclosure of the
information, and his motion to suppress was,
therefore, properly denied.
State v. Overton, 60 N.C* App. at 31, 298 S.E.2d 713,

Further, the Utah Legislature has specifically declared
that privacy interests of the depositor in bank records becomes
secondary, when those records are sought as part of an official
investigation.

The Legislature in defining the scope of privacy

in financial records adopted a specific exception for official
investigations conducted by the Attorney General.

Specifically

the statute states;
Nothing in this act shall apply where an
examination of said records is a part of an
official investigation by any local police,
sheriff, city attorney, county attorney, the
attorney general, or the State Department of
Public Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery
Services, Department of Social Services.
Utah Code Annotated, S 78-27-50 (1987).
The records, appellants seek to exclude from evidence,
fall directly within the parameters and scope of section 78-2750.

The legislature has determined that any privacy interest in

financial records is subsumed by the importance of an official
investigation.

In In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation,

738 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1987) 3 , this Court in ruling on whether §
78-27-50 exempts the Attorney General from reimbursing the bank
for the costs of producing records pursuant to its subpoena in an
official investigation, this Court after quoting the Section,
cited above, held

Not to be confused with the In the Matter of a Criminal
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), cited earlier.

-That section clearly exempts law
enforcement agencies, including the attorney
general, from all provisions of the Act, not
just the requirement of paying costs.
Nothing in the Act applies to an
investigation by the attorney general;
therefore, the Act has no bearing on the
question before us." Ici. at 1029.
While it is true that only the question of payment of
fees for the reproduction of bank records was addressed in that
matter, this Court's holding is applicable to the question of
whether or not depositors in financial institutions have the
right, under provisions of the Judicial Code specifically § 7827-45 through 50, (see Addendum D) to the protections of those
sections regarding notification, right to intervene, and
restrictions on admissibility of evidence.

Section 78-27-50

answers that question decisively by providing that those
protections of the Code do not apply in official investigations
conducted by the Attorney General.

This Court's holding cited

above leaves no doubt that "nothing in the act applies to an
investigation by the Attorney General."

While § 78-27-45 et.seq.

and this Courts ruling in In the Matter of a Criminal
Investigation, 738 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1987) may not be entirely
dispositive of the issue presented in this case, those provisions
do show a legislative intent to exempt the Attorney General among
other agencies from the notice requirements argued for by the
defendants.
CONCLUSION
The defendants have no standing to challenge the
admission of evidence gathered pursuant to the Subpoena Powers
Act.

No constitutional right, state or federal, personal to the

defendants, has been shown to have been violated.

The State of

Utah respectfully urges the Court to affirm the convictions of
the defendants.
DATED this

day of

vie-

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

STANLEY
Assistc
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

SUBPOENA POWERS

77-22-2

attend and testify in this state he shall not, while in this state pursuant
to such summons, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or
criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into
this state under the summons.
If a person passes through this state while going to another state in obedience to a summons to attend and testify in that state or while returning
therefrom he shall not, while so passing through this state, be subject to
arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this state under the summons.
History: C 2*53. 77-2]-5. enacted by L
1980, ch 15, f Z
p,Mi-tifiiitiiL
Crass-Karereecas.
Similar provision for witnesses la civil
suits, 7S-24-12.

Collateral Bsferaacae.
Arreit C=>ftProcess ** 120
6 A aS A r m l
» W. 72 CJS Process | SO
S AmJur tt 78S, ArTaat 1108

CHAPTER 22
SUBPOENA POWERS FOR AID OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION AND GRANTS OF IMMUNITY
Section
77-22-1 Declaration of necessity
77*22-2 Right to subpoens sritnesses and require production of evidence — Contents of subpoens — Interrogation before closed court.
77-224 Immunit) granted to witness — Refusal of witness to testify or produce evidence
— Powers granted prosecuting tttorneys in addition to other powers.

77-22-1. Declaration of ueceeaity. It ia declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that it ia necessary to grant aubpoena powers in aid
of criminal investigations and to provide a method of keeping information
gained from investigations aecret both to protect the innocent and to prevent criminal suspects from having access to information prior to prosecution and to clarify the power of the attorney general and county attorneys
to grant immunity from proaecution to witnesses whoae testimony ia esaentia) to the proper conduct of a criminal investigation or proaecution.
History: C 1*53, 77-22-1, aaactad by L
ItSO.elLlMt

promt EUTV, lac v. Coadtr (1961) 635 F 2d
412.

Praascetor's paMie statosaeuta.

Farpseas af Act.

Tail Act has codified the elementary prinThe purposes of the secrecy provisions af
dpic af criminal justice that prosecutors are this Act art to protect the innocent and also
required to try their cases ia the courtroom to prevent criminal suspects from having
aad that it is wholly inappropriate far them access to investigative information prior to
to make public damaging aUegstions against prosecution KUTV, lac. v. Coader (1981) (35
a putative defendant during the discovery r 2d 411

77-22-2, Right to aubpoena witneaaea and require production of evidence — Contenta of aubpoena — Interrogation before cloeed court.
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of a crime, the existence of
a crime or malfeasance in office or any criminal conspiracy or activity, the
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77-22-3

UTAH OODK Of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

attorney general or any county attorney shall have the right, upon application and approval of the district court, for good cause shown, to conduct
an investigation in which the prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel
their attendance and testimony under oath before any certified court
reporter, and require the production of books, papera, documents, recordings and any other items which constitute evidence or may be relevant to
the investigation in the judgment of the attorney general or county attorney.
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible defendants
and need only contain notification that the testimony of the witness is
sought in aid of criminal investigation and state the time and place of the
examination, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdication
of the prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform the party served that
he is entitled to be represented by counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall
be paid as in a civil action.
(3) The attorney general or any county attorney may make written
application to any district court and the court may order that interrogation
of any witness shall be held in secret; that such proceeding be secret; and
that the record of testimony be kept secret unless and until the court for
good cause otherwise orders. The court may order excluded from any investigative hearing or proceeding any persons except the attorneys representing the state and members of their staffs, the court reporter and the
attorney for the witness.
History: C 1953, T7-22-2* enacted by L
1980, eh IS, 12.
Collator*! sUfsrsaca*.
Corporste book, and rsconU. custody or
possession who has possession, custody, or
control of corporate books or records for purposes of order to produce, 47 ALR 3d 676.
Self-incrimination, possession: privilege
against self-incrimination as ground for

refusal to product noncorporate document*
in possession of person asserting privilege
b u t 0W1,ad b y
* n o t h t r - ** A L R M 1373*
Self-incriminstion, right of member, om•*• *»Mt» * * » • * " <* P n v * * corporaUon
•* aaincorporatad association to assert personal privilege against self-incrimination
with respect to production of corporste books
or racords, 52 ALR 3d 636.

77-22-3, Immunity granted to witness — Refusal of witness to testify or produce evidence — Powers granted prosecuting attorneys in
addition to other powers. In any investigation or prosecution of a criminal case, the attorney general and any county attorney shall have the
power to grant transactional immunity from prosecution to any person
who is called or who is intended to be called as a witness in behalf of the
state whenever the attorney general or county attorney deems that the testimony of cuch person is necessary to the investigation or prosecution of
such a case. No prosecution shall be instituted against the person for any
crime disclosed by his testimony which is privileged under this action, provided that should the person testify falsely, nothing herein contained shall
be construed to prevent prosecution for perjury.
If during the investigation or prosecution a person refuses to answer a
question or produce evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be
incriminated thereby, the attorney issuing the subpoena may file a request

ItB

SEARCH AND ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS

77*22-3

in writing with the district court in which the examination is being conducted for an order requiring that person to answer the question or
produce the evidence requested. The court shall set a time for hearing and
order the person to appear before the court to show cause, if any he has,
why the question should not be answered or the evidence produced, and
the court ahall order the question answered or the evidence produced
unless it finds thai to do so would be clearly contrary to the public interest,
or could subject the witness to a criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction. If the witness still refuses to answer or produce the evidence, he shall
be guilty of contempt of court and punished accordingly. If the witness
complies with the order and he would have been privileged to withhold the
answer given or the evidence produced by him except for this section, that
person shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture on
account of any fact or act conerning which, he was ordered to answer or
produce evidence except he may nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected
to penalty for any perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in
answering, failing to answer, or for producing or failing to produce any
evidence in accordance with the order.
The powers specified in this chapter are in addition to any other powers
granted to the attorney general or county attorneys.
* History: C 1953, 77-22-3, enacted by I*
Public officer constitutional privilege as
1980, eh 15,12.
violated by removal or discharge of public
_ „
.« *
officer or employee because of assertion of
Collateral Rtferofteoa.
immunity, 44 ALR 2d 790
Witnesses $ » 304
Right of defendant in criminal proceeding
96 CJS Witnesses 1439
^ n a v e jmmunit) from prosecution granted
SI AmJur 2d 87-98. Witnesses | | S4-€l
to defense witness, 4 ALR tih 617
Adequacy of immunity offered as condition
Waiver of privilege, in exchange for immuof denial of privilege against aelf-incrimina- nity from prosecution, as barring reaasertion
tion, S3 ALR 2d 1030
of privilege or account of prosecution in
Attorneys use in disbarment proceeding of another jurisdiction, 2 ALR 2d 631
testimon> given by attorney in criminal proeeeding under grant of immunity, €2 ALR 3d U w «wwa.
1145
Utah Supreme Court Survey - 1977, 1978
Prosecutor's power to grant prosecution Utah L Rev. 389,411.
witness immunity from prosecution, 4 ALR
4th 1221.
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
AjsbigvJty as U scope of iamammlty.
Aothority to grant iamsasualty.
The state may not claim any benefit from
Deputy county attorney did not have
the ambiguous aature of the prosecuting authority to grant immunity from prosecuattorney's grant of immunity, and any ques- tion aa such a grant must have been made b>
tions of interpretation must be resolved in the attorney general or count) attorney
l a w of the defendant State •. Ward (1977) State v. Ward (1977) 571 F Id 1343
171 F 2d 1343, Stats ?. Anderson (1980) €12 F

urn
CHAPTER 23
SEARCH AND ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS
Section

77-23-1.

"Starch warrant" deAood
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ADDENDUH B

SUBPOENA POWERS
1989
CENERAL SESSION
rolled Copy
B. Ilo. 117

By

ACT RELATING TO

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE;

Lyle W. Uillyard

PROVIDING

REVISIONS

TO

THE

SUBPOENA POWERS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.
IS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
[ENDS:
77-22-2,

AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 101, LAWS OF UTAH 19B8

77-22-3,

AS EXACTED BY CHAPTER 15, LAWS OF UTAH 1980

KACTSi
77-22-4,

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

77-22-5,

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

e it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1.

Section

77-22-2, Utah

Code

Annotated

1953, as last

unended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1988, is amended to read:
77-22-2.
:rime

or

(1) (a)

In any Batter involving the

a

may,

upon

application

and

of the district courtC?] and for good cause shown, conduct [an]

a criminal investigation.

[For-the-investigationy-the-preseeutor]

(b) The application and statement of good cause shall state
any

of

malfeasance in office, or any criminal conspiracy or activity,

the attorney general or any county attorney
approval

investigation

other

vhc-her

investigative order related to the investigation at issue has

been filed in another court.

S. B. No. 117

(2) (a) The
witnesses, compel

attorney
their

general

or

attendance

county

and

attorney

testimony

may

under

oath

recorded by a suitable electronic recording device or to be given
any

certified

court

reporter,

and

require

the

subpoena
to be
before

production of books,

papers, documents9 recordings and any other items [which] that constitute
evidence or may be relevant to the investigation [rn-the-judgment-of—the
attorney-generat-or-coonty-attorney].
(b) The attorney general or county attorney shall first apply to the
district

court for each subpoena, showing that the requested information

is reasonably related to the criminal

investigation

authorised

by

the

court*
(3) The prosecutor shall state in each subpoena:
(a) the time and place of the interrogation;
(b) that

the subpoena is issued in aid of a criminal investigation;

and
(c)

the right to have counsel present.

(4) The prosecutor shall also personally inform each witness at

the

beginning of each compelled interrogation:
(a) of the general subject matter of the investigation;
(b) of

the privilege at any time during the proceeding to refuse to

answer any question or produce any evidence

of

a

communicative

nature

that may result in self-incrimination;
(c) that any information provided may be used against the witness in

2-
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a subsequent criminal proceeding; and
(d) of the right to have counsel present•
(5)

If

the

attorney

general

or

county

attorney has substantial

evidence that the subpoenaed witness has committed a crime that is
investigation

he

shall

inform

that

witness,

in

person

under

prior

to

of

the

interrogation, of that witness's target status and of the nature
charges under consideration against him.
[{2}]

(6) (a) The

subpoena need not disclose the names of possible

defendants [and-need-onfcyt-eontain^otification-that-the-testimony-of-the
witnessHrs-sooght-xn-aid-of-eriminal-investrgationt] but shall state

the

time and place of the examination, which may be conducted anywhere within
the

jurisdiction of the prosecutor issuing the subpoenalfand-inform-the

party-served-that-he-is-entitied-to-be-represented-by-cotxnsei].
(b) Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a civil action.
Cf3$] (7) (a) The attorney general or any county attorney
written

application

to

any

district

or

the

substance

make

court [and] showing a reasonable

likelihood that publicly releasing information about the
witness

may

identity

of

a

of the evidence resulting from a subpoena or

interrogation would pose a threat of harm to a person or otherwise impede
the investigation.

Upon a finding of reasonable

likelihood,

the

court

may order that£
Ci)

interrogation

of

[any] m witness be held in secret; [that-the

proceeding]
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(ii) the occurrence of the interrogation and

other

subpoenaing

of

Evidence, the identity of the person subpoenaedf and the substance of the
evidence obtained be kept secret; and [that]
(iii) the

record of testimony and other subpoenaed evidence be kept

secret unless [and-tintit] the court

for

good

cause

otherwise

orders.

[The]
(b) After

application,

the

from any investigative hearing
attorneys
who

in

or

court

auty bjr order (excluded] exclude

proceeding

any

persons

except

the

representing the state [and] x ©embers of their staffs, persons
the

judgment

of

the

attorneys

representing

reasonably necessary to assist in the investigative

the

state

process,

the

are

court

reporter or operator of the electronic recording device, and the attorney
for the witness.
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent attorneys representing the
state

or

members

of

their

pursuant to this chapter for

staff from disclosing information obtained
the

purpose

of

furthering

any

official

governmental investigation.
(8) If

the state's application and good cause showing for the order

authorizing the investigation and the order itself contain the identities
of witnesses and targets of the investigation, the

attorney

general

or

county attorney may submit an application to any district court showing a
reasonable

likelihood

that

publicly

releasing information about those

identities would pose a threat of harm to a person

4-
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the

investigation.

The court may order that the application, good cause

shoving, and order for the entire investigation be kept secret unless the
court for good cause otherwise orders.
Section 2.

Section 77-22-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted

by

Chapter IS, Lavs of Utah 1980, is amended to read:
77-22-3.

(1)

In

any

investigation

or prosecution of a criminal

case, the attorney general and any county attorney [shall-have-the—power
to] may

grant transactional immunity from prosecution to any person who

is called or vho is intended to be called as a witness [in] on behalf

of

the state [whenever] when the attorney general or county attorney [deems]
finds

that

the

testimony

of

[such]

the

person

investigation or prosecution of [such-a] the case*
(2) (a) A prosecution [shaii] may
person

for

any

crime

disclosed

not

be

is necessary to the
[Ho]

instituted

against

the

by his testimony [which-is-priviieged

ander-this-action—provided-that-shooid] pursuant to this chapter, unless
the evidence is volunteered by such person or

is

not

responsive

to

a

question.
(b) However,

if

the

person

[testify] testifies falsely, [nothing

herein-contarned-shaH-be—construed—to]

immunity

granted

under

this

section does not prevent prosecution for perjury*
13) (a) If

during

the

investigation or prosecution [a] any person

refuses to answer a question or produce
ground

that

he

evidence

of

any

kind

on

the

may be incriminated [thereby], the attorney issuing the

•5-
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subpoena nay file [a-reqoest] an application in writing with the district
court in which the examination is being conducted for an order

requiring

that person to answer the question or produce the evidence requested.
(b) The

court

shall set a time for hearing and order the person to

appear [before-the-court] to

show

cause!7—if—any—he—hasj]

why

the

question should not be answered or the evidence producedtj-and-the]^
(c) The

court

shall

order

the

question answered or the evidence

produced unless it finds that [to-do-so] ijt would be clearly contrary
the

public

interest!?] or

could

subject

the

witness

to

to a criminal

prosecution in another jurisdiction.
(d) If the witness still refuses to answer or produce the
he

[shall—be]

j_i guilty

of

contempt

evidence,

of court and shall be punished

accordingly*
(e) If the witness complies with the order and he
privileged

to

would

have

withhold the answer given or the evidence produced by him

except for this section, [that-pereon-shaii] he may not be prosecuted
subjected

to

concerning
[except].
penalty

answering,

penalty

or

which!?] he

forfeiture

was

ordered

on

account

to

answer

of
or

any

any

perjury,

false

swearing

or

contempt

or

fact or act

produce

However, he may [nevertheless] be prosecuted or

for

been

evidence

subjected

to

committed

in

failing to answer, or for producing or failing to produce any

evidence in accordance with the order.
(fhe-powers-specified-in-this-chapter-are-in-addrtion—to—any—other
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powers-granted-to-the-attorney-generai-or-cottnty-attorneytT]
Section 3.

Section 77-22-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to

read:
77-22-4.
general
court

or

In all investigations under Section 77-22-2f the
county

the

attorney

following

shall

records

of

attorney

maintain and file with the district
the

criminal

investigation,

unless

otherwise ordered by the court:
(1) a copy of the good

cause

statement

and

application

for

the

authorisation of the criminal investigation;
(2) a

copy of all motions made to the court by the attorney general

or the county attorney;
(3) a copy of all court orders;
(A) a copy of all subpoenas issued;
(5) detailed

descriptions

of

all

documents

and

other

evidence

produced in response to subpoenas;
(6) a copy of all transcripts of testimony

taken

pursuant

to

the

subpoena; and
(7) a

copy

of all written communications between the court and the

attorney general or county attorney and staff*
Section *•

Section 77-22-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted

to

read:
77-22-5.

The

powers

of this chapter are in addition to any other

powers granted to the attorney general or county attorneys.
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ADDENDUM C

FILED
SEP 211934
emxE c. PUNK.
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

)
)
j

MEMORANDUM DECISION
RELATIVE TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY

i

CS NO. 1

On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held In this
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal Investigation proceeding.

The Court ruled from the bench on most

Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et seq.), authorizing
the Investigative procedure being used as raised by several
of the parties for the first time 1n their own behalf and by
ether parties en a Motion to reconsider.
The Court previously considered the constitutional
challenge to the Act at a hearing held en May 30, 1984, and
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that 1n
Its application the Statt Prosecutors comply with tht following requirements:
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to tht
Act aust be Informed whether or not thty Art
targets of the Investigation;

Recorded in Judzment feci

2. Such witnesses Bust be informed of
the nature of the natter under Investigation
and the scope of the Investigation;
3. Investigations conducted under the
authority of the Act must be limited to
criminal Investigations within the parameters
of the Initial good cause affidavit.
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity
to see the manner In which the Act has been applied and 1s
being applied and the way 1t can be used to violate the
personal rights of the citizens of this state.
For Instance* the subpoena duces tecum served upon
Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce:
•records which Identify all officers,
directors, consultants and employees
(both union and non-union, professional
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period
1979 to the present. Such shall Include,
but not be limited to, names, addresses,
telephone numbers, dates of employment*
and emp1o>ee numbers. If known."
Upon challenge, this Court ordered that general
subpoena suppressed as being too broad In any Investigation
of any criminal activity.
A previous subpoena Issued by the Attorney General's
Office attempted to get Into Utah Power and Light Company's
dealings In uranium mining, when 1n fact the original Good
Cause Affidavit mentioned no Indication of any criminal dealings In this area.

The Statt withdrew this subpoena when

challenged In this court.
•2-

Another subpoena Issued out of this proceeding
was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production of
the following:
"You are commanded to bring with you any and all
books, records, papers of any kind relating to
Hike Thompson and Associates, Guardex, Alarmex,
Vanguard, Mike Thompson, Individually; M1ke H e m s k l ,
Individually; Bruce Conklln, Individually; Patsy
Bowman, Individually; and all other Individuals
and/or entitles associated therewith."
This subpoena was withdrawn by the State upon challenge 1n
this Court.
The deposition of I. Brent Fletcher,taken pursuant
to subpoena Issued under this Investigative proceeding, did
not comply with the requisites that this Court feels must be
imposed to make the Act constltulonal in its application 1n
that the witness never was Informed that he was a target,
nor as to the nature of the Investigation and, because of
the Secrecy Order, he had no way of knowing whether the natter
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good cause
showing.

He was allowed, and did have, his attorney present

with him during these proceedings.
Some criminal charges have already been filed 1n Salt
Lake County based upon Information obtained through this proceed
1ng, and a civil antitrust case has been filed In Salt Lake
County, also as a result of tome of the Information derived fro»
this investigative proceeding.

This investigative proceeding 1*
•1-

still open and being used for whatever purposes the State
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act,
without limitation as to when • criminal Investigation
becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of
the findings for civil purposes.
The Act has been abused and 1s subject to continued
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limitatlons upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their
subpoena power.

The Court quite agrees with the Utah Supreme

Court 1n its statement given 1n the case of In Re The Matter of
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as follows:
"When State action Impinges on fundamental rights,
due process requires standards which clearly
define the scope of permlssable conduct so as
to avoid unwarranted Intrusion on those rights."
This Court has, therefore, concluded that the Act
1s too vague and does not give proper protection to individual
citizens against violation of their constltulonal right of
due process and protection against self-incrimination and
allows for an absolute abuse of. power without the benefit of
Judicial review or control once the general subpoena power
1s granted tnd finds the Act Is unconstitutional.
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THEREFORE, the Court does hereby dismiss this

Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court.
DATED this < ^ / ^ d a y .. September, 1984.

/" ~BOYD «NNFLLf-"DjSTBirf COURT,'
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ADDENDUM D

Financial information privacy — W ritten consent or court order for disclosure by financial
institution — Exception — "Person" defined.
No person acting in behalf of the state, or any agency, office, department,
bureau or political subdivision thereof, shall request or obtain, by subpoena or
otherwise, information from a state or federally chartered financial institution regarding the financial transactions or other records reflecting the financial condition of any person without first obtaining written permission from
the person whose financial transactions or other records of financial condition
are to be examined, or obtaining an order from a court of competent jurisdiction permitting access to the information. This section does not apply to reviews made by the commissioner of financial institutions to determine
whether or not a financial institution is operating in accordance with law. As
used in this act "person" shall include an individual, corporation, partnership
or association
K

t

im7
C | L 143 | L
of "this act". - The Urm "this
= * in the laat atntenct. M i n i

Uw§ 1977, Chapter 143, which appea n§ an
*S 78-27-45 to 78-27-50
Croaa-Referencca. - Credit information
•ichange, I 7-14-1 at aaq.

78-27-46. Financial information privacy — Notice to pei•on about whom information sought
(1) In the event a court order is obtained pursuant to § 78 27-45, notice
thereof shall be given to the person about whom information is sought within
three days of the day on which service of the order is made upon the financial
institution, but no later than seven days before the day fixed in the order as
the day upon which the records are to be produced or examined. The notice
shall be accompanied by a copy of the order which has been served upon the
financial institution and the motion or application upon which it is based and
shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the rights of the person
under § 78-27-47
(2) The notice shall be sufficient if, on or before the third day after issuance
of the order, notice is served in the manner provided in Rule 4(e), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, upon the person entitled to notice, or is mailed by certified
or registered mail to the last known address of the person. In the event the
person entitled to notice is deceased or under legal disability, notice shall be
served upon or mailed to the last known address of such person's executor
adminfstrator, guardian or other fiduciary.
Mint! " i ' 111 Ill Ill Ill

1 11 Ilia , (1 2

78-27-4*

financial inf o r m a tkm privacy — Intervention to
challenge or stay order — Burden on governmental entity.

!" h (.withstanding any other law or rule of law, any 'person w Ui . .:
notice of a court order under § 78-27-46 shall have the right u
r
any proceeding with respect to enforcement of the order to challenge the
iasuance of the order or to stay compliance therewith. Upon intervention, the
burden shall be upon the state, agency, officer, department, bureau or political subdivision obtaining the order to show that there is reasonable cause for
the issuance of the order and that the information sought may further the
investigation.

78-27-48. Financial information privacj
Reimbursement of financial institution for costs of obtaining information.
Any financial institution which produced records pursuant to permission or
in compliance with an order obtained under this act shall be entitled to reimbursement by the party or parties seeking the information, for costs reasonably and directly incurred in searching for, reproducing, or transporting
books, papers, records, or other data required to be produced. The commis-

78-27-49

JUDICIAL CODE

sionei of financial institutions shall by regulation estau conditions under which reimbursement shall be made.

i

Hiitory: L 1*77, ck 143, I 4.
Meaning of "this act". — Ste note following same catchline in note* to I 7S-27-45.

'.

. Financial information privacy
of information restricted.

Admissibility

No information obtained directly or indirectly from a financial institution
in violation of the provisions of this act shall be admissible in any court of this
state against the person entitled to notice. This section does not apply in any
action between the financial institution and the person otherwise entitled to
notice or in any action in which it is claimed that the financial institution has
been the victim of fraud, embezzlement or any other criminal art committed
by the person otherwise entitled to notice.
History: L. 1977, ck. 143, I &
Meaning of "this act". — Stt note following same eatchhne in notes to I 78-27-45.

7g.27.50. Financial information privacy — Act inapplicable to certain official investigations.
Nothing in this act shall apply where an examination of said records is a
part of an official investigation by any local police, sheriff, city attorney,
county attorney, the attorney general, or the State Department of Public
Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery Services, Department of Social Services
mmmj: L iff J ell I II I "•

ADDENDUM E

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITT TTTOKf O F THF JTNITED STATES
AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
AMEN DMENT XX
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT IH
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but In, a manner to be
prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual aervice in time of War or public danger; nor ahall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness againat
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due proeeaa
of law; nor shall private property be Uken for public use, without jnit
compensation

it

ADDENDUM F

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in bis own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance ahall any accused person.
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or feet to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused ahall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife ahall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband sgainst bis wife, nor ahall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the aame offense.

ADDENDUM 6

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH

A IT. I, { 14

fee 14. [Unraasonable starches forbidden—Isiuanoa of warrant.]
The right of the people to be aceure in their persona, boutea, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and aeizurea ahall not be violated, and no warrant ahull issue but upon probable eauae aupported by
oath or aflBrmation, particularly describing the place to be aearched, and
the person or thing to be srized.
Oasptrsfela PttrUiaiL
Uotiuat Coatt., Art. Ill, | 7.

